

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

## **SECRET**

October 30, 1974

25X1

25X1

Dear	
In Bill Hyland's absence I questions asked by Mr. Colby in	
21 October concerning DCID 1/2.	

- a. We do not recommend continuation of the annual preparation of an Attachment to DCID 1/2. While there is a need within the intelligence community for coordinated views on areas of emphasis and deemphasis, the DCI's Perspectives together with the KIQs appear to do a more useful job than DCID 1/2. The extensive detail in DCID 1/2 tabulations tempts unwarranted use of the document, which is an expression of all-source information needs and is not suitable for specific decisions in terms of source (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.).
- b. There is not a productive interrelationship in INR's program between DCID 1/2 topics and priorities and the KIOs.
- c. DCID 1/2 has been of marginal value in our planning and programming. A few years ago, when personnel constraints forced INR to cut back coverage on certain countries, DCID 1/2 priorities were helpful but not essential in selecting countries to receive less attention.
- d. We would not develop a similar document if DCID 1/2 were discontinued.
- e. If DCID 1/2 is retained, we would suggest that it should consist primarily of a narrative discussion of changes in focus and priority -- along the lines of the first part of Section B.

Intelligence Community Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE Of E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: SB(1),(2) (3) or (4) (circle one or more) Approved For Release 2008/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001100060003-8

- 2 -SECRET

We recognize that the Perspectives and KIQs do not -- and are not intended to -- cover all requirements for intelligence; nor are they tailored to specific sources. There is a need for a better translation of Perspectives, KIQs and other expressions of guidance into terms that can be readily applied to sources. There is also a need to distribute requirements among sources (SIGINT, HUMINT, and PHOTINT) in a more discriminating way so that we do not ask one source to do things that can better be done by another.

Rather than continue DCID 1/2, we suggest that the community try to make better use of the source-oriented committees (SIGINT Committee, Human Sources Committee, and COMIREX) and improve the coordination among them. The problem is to keep the committees from going their separate ways, to focus their efforts on the most useful tasks appropriate to their sources, and to fit the results of their work into an over-all requirements scheme. One possible way of improving the coordination, and providing central guidance for the tasks of the committees, would be to establish a continuing coordinating group, chaired by the Deputy to the DCI for the NIOs and including the chairmen of the SIGINT Committee, Human Sources Committee, and COMIREX.

Sincerely,

020

William McAfee
Deputy Director for Coordination
Bureau of Intelligence and Research